ML-DSA certificates through EST
ML-DSA-44, 65 and 87 subject keys (FIPS 204), issued through standard EST from a request made by a stock OpenSSL 3.5 client. The test →
Every cryptographic operation in trstctl goes through one package, and the build fails if any other code imports crypto directly. Swapping an algorithm is one contained change. Post-quantum is the first migration run end to end.
In every edition, each with a test in the repository.
ML-DSA-44, 65 and 87 subject keys (FIPS 204), issued through standard EST from a request made by a stock OpenSSL 3.5 client. The test →
Enroll a host with an ML-DSA key; the agent generates it on the host, and renewals keep the algorithm.
ML-DSA, SLH-DSA and ML-KEM keys live in the signer, locked and zeroed in memory, and survive restarts.
Every scanned key is rated, and each quantum-vulnerable one gets its FIPS 203, 204 or 205 target. Campaigns close with signed, offline-verifiable evidence. Find it before you renew it →
Post-quantum support and proof-carrying succession ship in the free core. There is nothing to unlock.
Each algorithm move is a record both keys sign, replay-proof, downgrade-guarded inside the signer, logged and verifiable offline. API only today.
None of these is shipped today. Each is one module behind the boundary above, which is the point of having it.
New algorithms register behind the boundary. Protocols, policy, inventory and console do not change.
One tree to audit and replace, not every call site that ever needed a signature.
Signing runs in a separate process with no HTTP server and no database driver. The control plane can ask for a signature, not produce one.
Inventory the cryptography you have, enroll one host with an ML-DSA key, and verify the certificate with the OpenSSL you already run.