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Crypto agility · post-quantum alpha

One crypto boundary. Post-quantum is the first proof.

Every cryptographic operation in trstctl goes through one package, and the build fails if any other code imports crypto directly. Swapping an algorithm is one contained change. Post-quantum is the first migration run end to end.

What runs today

Six things you can check.

In every edition, each with a test in the repository.

ML-DSA certificates through EST

ML-DSA-44, 65 and 87 subject keys (FIPS 204), issued through standard EST from a request made by a stock OpenSSL 3.5 client. The test →

The host agent keeps the choice

Enroll a host with an ML-DSA key; the agent generates it on the host, and renewals keep the algorithm.

Keys stay in the isolated signer

ML-DSA, SLH-DSA and ML-KEM keys live in the signer, locked and zeroed in memory, and survive restarts.

The inventory knows what is vulnerable

Every scanned key is rated, and each quantum-vulnerable one gets its FIPS 203, 204 or 205 target. Campaigns close with signed, offline-verifiable evidence. Find it before you renew it →

Every edition, no license

Post-quantum support and proof-carrying succession ship in the free core. There is nothing to unlock.

Proof-carrying succession patent pending preview

Each algorithm move is a record both keys sign, replay-proof, downgrade-guarded inside the signer, logged and verifiable offline. API only today.

What comes next

Next behind the same boundary.

None of these is shipped today. Each is one module behind the boundary above, which is the point of having it.

  • Hybrid post-quantum key exchange on the listeners. Today they negotiate classical key exchange.
  • A post-quantum issuing CA. Today the issuer is classical ECDSA P-256 and post-quantum keys sit under it, which is what stock clients can chain to.
  • Orchestrated estate re-keying with rollback. Today: the inventory, the campaign, and re-issuance through normal enrollment.
  • Also on the way. Composite certificates, SLH-DSA certificates, post-quantum keys through the HSM backends, and succession driving re-issuance. Pure ML-DSA stays on EST and the Workload API; SCEP cannot carry it by protocol.
  • What is not shipped is written down. The limitations page, kept current with every release.
Why one boundary

The architecture is the asset. Post-quantum is its first demo.

Migration is a module, not a program

New algorithms register behind the boundary. Protocols, policy, inventory and console do not change.

A crypto CVE has a blast radius of one package

One tree to audit and replace, not every call site that ever needed a signature.

Keys are out of reach

Signing runs in a separate process with no HTTP server and no database driver. The control plane can ask for a signature, not produce one.

trstctl.com/crypto-agility

Read what runs today. Then run it.

Inventory the cryptography you have, enroll one host with an ML-DSA key, and verify the certificate with the OpenSSL you already run.